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CASE BRIEFS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Severely Impaired Worker Who Can Continue Past Work Not
Eligible for Disability Income
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted summary judgment to Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security, thereby affirming the Commissioner's denial of Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) to Plaintiff James Sosa.'
Sosa had worked as a laborer, material handler and stock clerk for
over fifteen years with various employers. a He claimed he was unable
to continue working because of back pain, dizziness, stroke, a nervous
condition, high blood pressure and asthma, and he therefore applied for
SSI disability benefits.3 When his application was twice denied, he
requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(AUj).
4
The ALJ reviewed Sosa's medical evidence, which included
Sosa's testimony in addition to the testimony of a vocational expert. 5
Given the evidence presented, and the Social Security regulations, the
ALJ found Sosa's medical conditions constituted a severe impairment,
but that these impairments, even in combination, did not meet or equal
a listed impairment. 6 Further, the ALJ found Sosa could perform past
work as a stock clerk, and concluded that Sosa was not disabled
according to the definition provided by the Social Security Act. 7
1Sosa v. Bamhart, No. 03 C 2109, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15536 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3,
2003).
2Id. at *2.
3Id. at * 1-2.
4 d. at *2.
5Id. at *3-7.6Sosa, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15536 at *8.
71d. at *8-9.
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In considering Sosa's request for reversal of the AL's judgment,
the District Court first reviewed the evidence and found the AL's
determination showed an "accurate bridge between the evidence and
the result," although the court noted the ALJ could have more clearly
laid out reasons why Sosa's allegations regarding his limitations were
not credible. 8 Next, the court rejected Sosa's assertion of error based
on the AL's failure to order a consultative mental health examination
in light of the Social Security Administration's recorded observations,
which indicated Sosa could have a cognitive impairment because he
talked fast, made quick movements and seemed nervous. 9 The court
found the ALJ did not commit error, reasoning the ALJ was under no
duty to request a consultative examination given the absence of
objective medical evidence of a cognitive impairment.10
The court also rejected Sosa's alternative request for remand to the
ALJ for further hearing because of new evidence." The court
concluded that the new evidence - that Sosa had been referred to a
physical therapist, an ophthalmologist and a neurologist - was not
material and did not establish a reasonable probability that the new
records would have changed the AL's opinion, namely that Sosa could
continue his past relevant work. 12 Sosa v. Barnhart, No. 03 C 2109,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15536 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2003).
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Pro Se Plaintiffs Failed in Eighth Amendment Claim and Unable to
Bring Discrimination Claim Under ADA Without Exhausting
Procedural Requirements
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
recommended that the defendant physician and prison official's motion
for summary judgment be granted where the pro se plaintiffs, wheel-
chair bound prisoners, failed to comply with the Prison Litigations
Reform Act's administrative requirement prior to alleging violations of
their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Eighth
Amendment, and the evidence they provided did not establish such
violations.
13
'Id. at *10-11.
91d. at *13-16.
"
0Id. at *16.
'lSosa, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15536 at *17.
"Id. at *21.
1 3Johnson v. Bendheim, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15990 (S.D.N.Y. September 8, 2003).
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The plaintiff prisoners were disabled and serving sentences in a
correctional facility unit for disabled prisoners. 14 The prisoners were
under the defendant physician's care for their respective medical
conditions, which required pain management treatment and referrals to
outside medical specialists. 1 The patients challenged the physician's
medical treatment as violating their Eighth Amendment rights because
the physician demonstrated deliberate indifference to their serious
medical needs. 16 In a prison context, deliberate indifference may be
shown when a known serious risk to health or safety is disregarded.
17
The evidence in the record provided by the physician
established that the pain management treatment of the patients was
reasonable and consistent with appropriate medical standards.18 The
court recognized that prisoners are entitled to medical care under the
Eighth Amendment; however, found that challenges to the course of
medical treatment do not give rise to Eighth Amendment violations, as
prisoners are not entitled to the medical treatment of their choice.'
9
The court noted the physician's refusal to prescribe medication to the
prisoner in order to treat erectile dysfunction was not a deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need.2°
Because the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to
establish a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs they were
unable to meet the requirements of their Eighth Amendment claim.2'
Finally, their failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
bringing a claim based on the Americans with Disabilities Act
warranted the magistrate judge's recommendation that the defendants'
motion for summary judgment be granted.22 Johnson v. Bendheim,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15990 (S.D.N. Y. September 8, 2003).
"1Id. at *31.
1Id. at *12-13.
1Id. at *5.
"1Id. at *29.
'
8Johnson, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15990. at *34.
19Id. at *33.2 0 d. at *17.
2 11d. at *34.2 21d. at *7.
20031
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CERTIFICATE OF NEED
State Agency Did Not Overstep Bounds Issuing Certificate of Need
for Consolidation of Two Hospitals Despite Objections
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the decisions of the lower
courts, which held a grant of a hospital certificate of need (CON) was
arbitrary and capricious.
2 3
Emery Healthcare and HCA Hospital Corporation of America
(EHCA) and two of its affiliates completed an application for a CON to
build a hospital that would "relocate and consolidate" two hospitals in
the Atlanta area. 24 Three other hospitals in the area objected to the
proposed CON because it stipulated for a replacement hospital rather
than a new hospital, although none of the hospitals objected to the
necessity of a CON.25 The cases involved the same facts so the Court
consolidated them into one decision.26 The CON underwent review by
the Division of Health Planning, which recommended issuing the
CON.27 Two separate county superior courts found the CONs to be
arbitrary and capricious, thus exceeding the Division of Health
Planning's authority.
28
The court noted that the Division of Health Planning was set up by
the State's General Assembly for the following reasons: (1) to avoid
unnecessary duplication of services, (2) to be cost effective, and (3) to
be compatible to the health care needs of the population.29 The statute
setting up the application process of CONs is broad and lists fourteen
considerations for the Division of Health Planning to consider.
30
The Court reasoned that the Division of Health Planning was
responsible for interpreting and applying the statute regarding CONs,
and also that the Division of Health Planning was to provide a high
level of expertise by having people specialize in this area.31 As such,
the Court gave the Division of Health Planning wide latitude in making
23Georgia Department of Community Health, Division of Health Planning v. Gwinnett
Hospital System, Nos. A03A1214, A03A1215, A03A1216, A03A1217, 2003 Ga. App.
LEXIS 1059 at * 1-3 (Ga. App. August 26, 2003).
24Id. at *125id.
261d
"
'Id. at *2.28Georgia Department of Community Health, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 at *2-3.291d. at *4-5.3
°Id. at *5.3
'Id. at *6-7.
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decisions regarding CONs.32 The Court held that the lower courts erred
in finding the Division of Health Planning's ruling as arbitrary and
capricious. 33 The Court further held the lower courts erred when it
ruled the CON should have been considered as a new facility rather
than as a replacement facility.
34
Finally, the Court held that the Division of Health Planning did
not exceed its authority granted to them by the General Assembly and
thus were not arbitrary in granting the CON to EHCA.35 Georgia
Department of Community Health, Division of Health Planning v.
Gwinnett Hospital Systems, Nos. AO3A.1214, A03A.1215, A03A1216,
AO3A1217, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 (Ga. App. August 26, 2003).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Medically Necessary Abortions Administratively Banned Not
Violative of Florida Equal Protection Clause
The Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District, affirmed the state
administration's ban on funding for medically necessary abortions and
held that the challenged rules did not violate the equal protection
Clause of the Florida Constitution because they were rationally related
to legitimate state interests.3
6
In this case, a women's health clinic, physician and patient
appealed an order of the Division of Administrative Hearings
dismissing their petition to determine whether the rules pertaining to
Medicaid funding for abortions violated Florida's Equal Protection
Clause.37 The appellants believed the ban on funding for medically
necessary abortions violated the state's equal protection Clause because
funding was not denied for services that were medically necessary for
men. 38  The appellants urged the court to apply a strict scrutiny,
standard of review in deciding the matter on sex based classifications.
The appellant patient had a history of epilepsy that caused her to
suffer seizures during a prior pregnancy. 40 In order to control the
321d. at *8-11.
33Georgia Department of Community Health, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1059 at * 18.34
Id.
35id.
36A Choice For Women, Inc. v. Florida Agency For Health Care Administration, No.
3D02-3039, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13200 at *7 (Fla. App. September 3, 2003).371d. at *3.381d"
39Id. at *6.
4 Id. at *2.
20031
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seizures, the patient was placed on a drug that occasionally caused birth
defects, and in this case the drug did in fact result in a child born with
birth defects. 41 At the time of this petition, the patient was a Medicaid
recipient who had three children. 42 When she became pregnant again
she was faced with two options, both of which involved significant
medical risks. The first option involved suffering an increase in
seizures upon ceasing the medication which had caused her to have a
child with birth defects. The second option was continuing her medical
treatment for epilepsy and facing the possibility of having another child
with birth defects. 3 For these reasons, the patient chose to have an
abortion.44 The physician who performed the patient's abortion stated
that many of his patients require medically necessary abortions, which
Medicaid will not pay for.45
In Florida, Medicaid funding is available only for health
services for which the state program receives federal reimbursement.46
Federal reimbursement is allowed for abortions only when the mother's
life is endangered by the pregnancy, or in cases of rape or incest.4 7 The
appellants argued that Medicaid's ban on medically necessary abortions
that fall outside of the prescribed limitation created a disadvantage to
women. They based their claim on the language in the Florida
Constitution, which intended to secure equality for women.48
The court held that sex based classifications were not afforded
strict scrutiny and thus applied rational basis review. 49 Under such
review, the rules challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause
must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in order to
stand. 50 The court recognized childbirth as a legitimate state interest as
Florida had an interest in the preservation of life. 51 The court also
recognized cost containment of the Medicaid program as a legitimate
state interest, and held that limiting payment to services that were
federally reimbursable was appropriate.52  Therefore, the
Administration's order dismissing the appellants' petition was
41A Choice For Women, Inc., 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13200 at *2.
421d.
431d.
44Id.
45Id. at *3.46A Choice For Women, Inc., 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13200 at * 1.4Tla.
4"Id. at *3.
49d. at *7.
5
°Id. at *5.
51A Choice For Women, Inc., 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13200 at *6.521Id.
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affirmed. A Choice For Women, Inc. v. Florida Agency For Health
Care Administration, No. 3D02-3039, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13200 at
*7 (Fla. App. September 3, 2003).
DAMAGES
Summary Judgment Granted When Evidence Failed to
Demonstrate Amount of Damages
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of
the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant tobacco
companies, thereby foreclosing recovery by HMOs for their members'
53health-care costs that resulted from tobacco use.
Three Minnesota non-profit HMOs sued the tobacco companies
under state law for unlawful trade practices, false statement in
advertising and prevention of consumer fraud.54 For the purposes of
their summary judgment motion, the tobacco companies conceded they
conspired to mislead the public about health risks associated with
smoking.55
The trial court granted summary judgment to the tobacco
companies after excluding evidence about damages presented by the
56HMOs' single expert witness. The court found the expert's
calculations about the extent of the damages to be speculative,
internally inconsistent and flawed.57
Although the Court of Appeals felt the work of the expert witness
was thorough, sophisticated and often well-grounded in scientific
literature, it nevertheless refrained from concluding the trial court
committed a clear error of judgment.58  The court held that the
admission of the expert testimony would undermine a "legal nexus
between the injury and the defendant's wrongful conduct" because the
court found the testimony to be inconsistent with the HMOs' theory of
the case. 59 Further, the court reasoned that because the HMOs had no
other evidence demonstrating the amount of damages allegedly caused
by the tobacco companies, a fact-finder would have to act arbitrarily to
53Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 02-1684, No. 02-1688, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 19147 at *5 (8th Cir. Minn. Sept. 16, 2003).
54Id. at *6.
55Id. at *5.56Id. at *15.571d.
58Group Health Plan, Inc. at * 19.
59Id. at *20-21.
2003]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
set a damage amount. 60 Thus, the court concluded the HMO's proof of
damages was insufficient to proceed to trial.61
The Appellate Court next considered whether the lower court
erred by granting summary judgment in the HMOs' suit for injunctive
relief, and concluded that because the tobacco companies did not
identify aspects of the record that demonstrated an absence of a
material issue of genuine fact, the tobacco companies had not met its
burden.62 The court therefore remanded for further consideration the
matter of injunctive relief, although, as noted above, it affirmed
summary judgment regarding damages.63 Group Health Plan, Inc. v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 02-1684, No. 02-1688, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19147 (8th Cir. Minn. Sept. 16, 2003).
Punitive Damages 45 Times Amount of Compensatory Damages
Found in Violation of Due Process Clause
The Court of Appeals of Oregon vacated a judgment in favor of
physician for $55.5 million in punitive damages on charges of
negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation by a pharmaceutical
company, and remanded in favor of the pharmaceutical company on
charges of excessive damages, with instructions to allow a new trial
unless the plaintiff agreed to a remittitur of punitive damages to $3.5
million within 28 days.6
4
Physician's patient was a long-time user of the defendant's
prescription asthma drug, Theo-Dur. 65 The patient was prescribed an
antibiotic by the physician and soon presented with nausea and
vomiting. 66 The physician ruled out drug toxicity because theophylline
had been promoted to him by the defendant as being safe and non
toxic. 67 After diagnosing the patient with gastroentitis and sending him
home, the patient experienced seizures and permanent brain damage.
Toxicity to theophylline was ruled as the cause of the patient's
injuries.68 Consequently, the patient filed suit against the defendant
pharmaceutical company and the physician, and the physician brought
60Id. at *22.6
lid.
621d. at *26-27.
63Group Health Plan, Inc. at *29.
64Bocci v. Key Pharms Inc., 189 Ore. App. 349 at *352 (Ore. App. Sept. 10, 2003).65/d.
6 6
ld.
67id.
68ld.
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a cross-claim against the defendant for negligence and fraud for failing
to provide adequate information about the drug's potential toxicity.
6 9
The physician was awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages and
$22.5 million in punitive damages, and the patient was awarded $5
million in compensatory and $35 million in punitive damages.70
The issue before the court was whether the amount punitive
damages, $55.5 million, was in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus excessive. 71 The court held that
these damages exceeded the amount tolerable under the Due Process
Clause, due to the high ratio between the compensatory and punitive
damages awarded.72
The court relied on a three-factor test to determine the
constitutionality of the punitive damages.73 The three factors consisted
of the degree of reprehensibility, the difference between the punitive
damages award by the jury and the civil penalties imposed in similar
cases, and the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the
punitive damages award.74 The court found that the actions were
reprehensible for a number of reasons, including: (1) the harm was
physical; (2) the conduct was characterized by a reckless disregard for
human health; (3) the misconduct was repeated nationwide; and (4)
harm was the result of deceit.75 The difference between the punitive
and civil penalties in this case were disregarded because the penalty
was criminal, and even though policy mandates that criminal sanctions
should have bearing on the seriousness with which the state views a
wrongful action, criminal sanctions do not have utility to determine the
amount of the monetary reward.76
Since precedent has suggested that a ratio between compensatory
and punitive damages over 4-1 may violate the constitution, the court
held that the present ratio of 45-1 was unquestionably
unconstitutional.77 The court then looked to see if there were any facts
78that justified a ratio beyond 4-1. Although the court found that the
defendant's actions were particularly egregious, as they resulted in
severe physical injury and had potential for causing more injury, the
69Bocci, 189 Ore. App. 349 at *352.70 d.71Id. at *353.72Id. at *361.
73Id. at *354.
74Bocci, 189 Ore. App. 349 at *355.751d. at *357-359.
76Id at *361.
77Id at *360.781d.
2003]
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court found the 45-1 ratio of damages not justified.79 Instead, the court
opted for a 7-1 ratio, and remanded for a new trial unless the physician
accepted a remittitur of the punitive damages to $3.5 million.80 Bocci
v. Key Pharms., Inc., 189 Ore. App. 349 (Ore. App. Sept. 10, 2003).
DEFAMATION
No Damages Awarded Physician Victim of HIV Defamation When
Not Spread Maliciously and Defendants Had Qualified Privilege
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the judgment of a jury
verdict that found employees at a pharmacy who spread false rumors
about a physician being HIV positive were not liable for defamation.
8 1
Rumors that the plaintiffs was HIV positive circulated from 1991
through 1993, shortly after her marital separation. 82  The rumors
resurfaced in 1997, and quickly spread through the entire pharmacy
department at a local Wal-Mart. 83 Once it was discovered that the
rumors were false, instructions were given to not repeat the rumor.
84
In order to establish a prima facie case of defamation, plaintiff was
required to show that the pharmacy employees both knew statements
were false and spread the rumor with reckless disregard of the truth.85
The court found that pharmacy employees were entitled to assert a
defense of "qualified privilege," since the statements were allegedly
made in "good faith," and about a subject matter which the party had an
interest in communication. 86 The interest in communication was that
the employees were pharmacists speaking about a potential health risk
within the community.
87
The court held that plaintiff did not prove any actual malice on the
part of the pharmacy employees, and therefore failed to meet is prima
facie burden for defamation. 88 Further, the court held the pharmacy
employees were entitled to the qualified privilege, and that they did
79Bocci, 189 Ore. App. 349 at *360.80Id at *361.
8 1Susan Johnson Whitehurst v. Martin Medical Center, No. W2001-03034-COA-RC-
CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 at * 1-2 (Tenn. App. August 28, 2003).821d. at *4.
83Id. at *5-6.
84Id.
85Whitehurst, 2003 Tenn App. LEXIS 619 at * 12.
86Id. at *13.871d.
881d. at * 18.
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demonstrate good faith.89 The verdict in favor of the defendants was
affirmed. 9° Susan Johnson. v. Martin Medical Center, P.C., No.
W2001-03034-COA-RC-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. App.
August 28, 2003).
DISABILITY
Medical School Dismissal of Student with Cognitive Disability Not
Discriminatory
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted a
Medical School summary judgment, on a disability-based
discrimination claim brought by a dismissed medical student who had
hearing loss and Attention Deficit Disorder.9'
The plaintiff was born with Crouzon's syndrome, a rare genetic
disorder characterized by distinctive malformations of the face and
skull.92  The multiple surgeries he underwent to correct this
disfigurement resulted in hearing loss.93  In addition, plaintiff had
Attention Deficit Disorder and other learning disabilities. 94
Plaintiff and the school's office of Disability Services requested
accommodations, including increased feedback from professors.9
5
Although the school provided most the accommodations, plaintiff
failed several classes, which required that he appear before the
Committee on Student Scholastic Standing (COSS) several times
throughout the course of his education.96 COSS repeatedly permitted
plaintiff to continue his studied at the medical school.97 However,
when the Medical School found that patient safety would be
compromised because the plaintiff was unable to adequately synthesize
data in a clinical setting, the COSS dismissed him.98
For the purposes of the school's summary judgment motion, the
court addressed whether the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" to
remain a student at the Medical School; and whether he was dismissed
89 Whitehurst, 2003 Tenn App. LEXIS 619 at *18.
90Id. at *26.
91Falcone v. Univ. of Minn., No. 01-1181, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15787 at *1 (D. Minn.
Sept. 3, 2003).
92/d. at *2, nI.
93Id. at *2.941d.
95Id. at *6-7.96Falcone, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15787 at *6-1 1.97
Id.
981d. at * 13.
2003]
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solely because of his disability.99 To determine whether the plaintiff
was "otherwise qualified," the court considered whether any reasonable
accommodation would have enabled the plaintiff to meet the
requirements of the medical program.100 Despite the school's failure to
provide the plaintiff with sufficient feedback on his clinical
performance, the court found the University did not act in bad faith
because it had otherwise provided him with extensive and significant
accommodations.'10 The court therefore held the plaintiffs consistent
inability to pass courses to demonstrate that he was not "otherwise
qualified" to meet academic standards.'
0 2
Tthe court found that the school's dismissal was based on the
plaintiffs inability to synthesize information, and not solely because of
his disability.'0 3 The court granted summary judgment to the Medical
School, and dismissed plaintiffs amended complaint with prejudice.' 0 4
Falcone v. Univ. of Minn., No. 01-1181, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15787
(D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2003).
DISCOVERY
Identity of Medical Malpractice Insurance Carrier Not Relevant or
Discoverable in Malpractice Action
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision Circuit Court of
Jefferson County, which found the identity of the treating physician's
medical malpractice insurance not discoverable.'
0 5
Defendant physician performed hip replacement surgery on
plaintiff, who had post surgery problems. 10 6 Noting these problems,
the defendant physician transferred the plaintiff to another hospital
where she was treated by various physicians over the course of her two
month stay. 107  These physicians originally diagnosed plaintiff as
having an operative nerve injury. 10 8
99 1d.
100d, at *16.
0'lFalcone, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15787 at *21-22.
°
2Id. at *26
l031d. at *27.
l041d.
l05Helen Zaden v. Richard Elkus, No. 1012149, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 260 at *36 (Ala.
September 12, 2003).
"'Id. at *2.
1071d.
'
081d. at *3.
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Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, alleging
medical negligence during surgery as the cause of her injury.109 During
the course of the trial there was evidence of ex parte communications
between the defendant's attorneys and the physician witnesses.' 10 The
plaintiff later suspected that the defendant physician and physician's
witnesses were engaged in foul play, and she was given reason to
suspect the defendant's medical malpractice carrier provided counsel
for the physician's witnesses, which caused them to depart from their
original theory of medical negligence."' To support her theory of
witness bias, the plaintiff sought to discover the identify of the
defendant's medical malpractice carrier.' 12
The trial court, however, found the carrier not relevant to the
subject matter of the action. 13 The court held that such matters were
within the sound discretion of the trial court.' 14 The Supreme Court of
Alabama found no abuse of discretion, as plaintiff had not presented
adequate evidence of a "sufficient connection" between the witness
and the liability insurance carrier for its admission." 5 Furthermore, the
record did not reveal any evidentiary errors that had been preserved for
review or impropriety by opposing counsel. 1 6 Zaden v. Elkus, No.
1012149, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 260 (Ala. September 12, 2003).
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
Hospital Liable to Patient by Third Party Contracts
The Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the trial court,
holding Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinic, Inc., (Shands)
responsible for injuries a heart lung machine operator's conceded
negligence caused Gary Juliana, II, (Gary) during open-heart
surgery."
7
When Gary was two months old, physicians detected both a heart
murmur and respiratory distress." 18 Gary's parents (Julianas) signed a
'
09 d. at *3.
"Zaden, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 260 at *14.
..Id. at *24.
"I
2 d. at *32.
"
3/d. at *31.
"1Id. at *25.
"Zaden, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 260 at *36.
"
6 d. at *51, 53.
u 7Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinic, INC., v. Gary Juliana, II, No. 1D02-1530, 2003
Fla. App. LEXIS 13157, at *1 (Fla. App. Aug. 29, 2003).
"Ild. at *2.
2003]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Shands admission form consenting to "diagnostic procedures, hospital
care, and medical trea tme...."1 9 The admission form stated that "all
physicians, residents, and students who provided services at Shands ...
are not employees, agents, or servants of the University of Florida,
Board of Regents, and are not employees, agents or students of
Shands.,,2°
The physicians performed open-heart surgery. 12 1 A perfusionist,
who evaluates intermittent blood samples with a blood gas analyzer,
was among the operating personnel.122  The perfusionist was
responsible for communicating problematic gas levels to the surgeon
and anesthesiologist so they could make the necessary adjustments.1 23
In this case, however, the perfusionist neither notified the surgical team
that there was a problem, nor attempted to make any adjustments.124
As a result of the perfusionist's negligence, Gary suffered severe brain
damage and now suffers from cerebral palsy, among other things.
125
The Court of Appeals of Florida reviewed and affirmed the trial
court's analysis regarding non-delegable duty. 126 The duty of Shands
arose from a contract, and thus could not be delegated. 27 The hospital
provided the services for the perfusionist, so the fact that the
perfusionist was an independent contractor rather than an employee
was irrelevant when considering the relationship between the hospital
and patient.28
The court also concluded that the contract between Shands and
Cardiovascular Perfusionists, Inc. (CVP) was not determinative of
whether the perfusionist should be deemed Shands's employee, or
whether Shands would liable to third parties for its agreements with the
perfusionist. 129  The possibility that CVP could be found to be an
independent contractor (and the perfusionist its employee and not
Shands') did not alter the fact that Shands breached the contractual
responsibility it made to the Julianas.130 The court found that perfusion
care plainly fell within the definition of "hospital care and medical
'
191d.
12°Id. at *2-3.
1211d. at *3.
122Shands Teaching Hosp., 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13157 at *4.
123Id. at *6.
1241d. at *7.
125id"
1261d.
127Shands Teaching Hosp., 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13157 at * 14.128id.
1291d. at *16.
13
°Id. at *19-20.
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treatment," thus establishing Shands' vicarious liability for the
perfusionist's negligence. 13 1 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's holding. 13 2 Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinic, INC., v. Gary
Juliana, II, No. 1D02-1530, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 13157 (Fla. App.
Aug. 29, 2003).
EXPERT WITNESS
Summary Judgment Granted When Expert Witness Unqualified to
Testify to Essential Element in Negligence Action
The Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed the Superior Court,
judicial district of New Britain's summary judgment favoring the
defendant hospital and its agent, where plaintiff could not establish
causation by expert testimony. 133
Plaintiffs general physician approved plaintiff for a required wrist
fusion surgery, although plaintiff was obese and had history of heart
problems. 134 Following outpatient surgery, plaintiff was admitted to
defendant hospital for intense pain and prescribed self-administered
morphine. 135 The defendant, an agent of the hospital, checked plaintiff
early in the morning and found him grayish in color and
unresponsive. 136 The defendant then summoned the physician on duty,
who administered Narcan to reverse the effects of the morphine. 37
Repeated doses, however, did not improve plaintiffs condition, and
was he was diagnosed as having suffered a heart attack and congestive
heart failure.' 38
The executor of plaintiffs estate filed a medical negligence
complaint, alleging that defendants knew or should have known the
effects the patient's obesity and history of heart problems in
conjunction with the depressive effects morphine would have on the
cardiac and pulmonary systems.' 39 The standard of care required more
frequent monitoring than other patients, and the failure to monitor him
for four hours constituted a breach of that standard, resulting in
311d. at "20-21.
132/d.
133Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 79 Conn. App. 78, at *90-91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
1341d. at *80-81.
1351d. at *81.
136 id.
137id.
1381d.
139 Sherman, 79 Conn. App. at *81-82.
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death. 140 Plaintiff was granted permission to have an advanced practice
registered nurse as his expert witness to testify as to the standard of
care, the breach of that standard, and that the breach caused the
plaintiffs injuries. 14 1 However, upon Defendant's motion to preclude
the nurse from testifying, the Superior Court issued an order precluding
the nurse, stating that the nurse had not demonstrated the experience or
training to qualify her to testify about the causation issues presented.
142
The defendants' subsequent motion for summary judgment was
granted, and plaintiff appealed. 1
43
On appeal, plaintiff argued that it was an abuse of discretion to
disqualify plaintiffs expert witness from testifying because the
witness's qualifications for testifying about causation should relate to
the weight of her testimony, and not its admissibility. 144 Because the
admissibility of expert testimony is determined by an expert's special
skill or knowledge related to a matter in issue, i.e. causation, the court
found that the Superior Court had properly excluded the nurse.' 45 The
court explained that the plaintiffs argument failed because only after
an expert witness is determined to be qualified, and thus admitted, is
any further objection related to its weight, not its admissibility. 146
Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment was not
warranted because the Superior Court improperly concluded that: (1)
causation requires expert testimony by a physician; (2) the case did not
fall within any exceptions to the general requirement of expert
testimony; and (3) the depositions of defendants' experts were
insufficient to show causation. 147  The court accepted the Superior
Court's determination that a nurse may possess sufficient skills and
knowledge to be qualified to testify to the issue of causation but in this
case plaintiffs expert did not qualify. 48 The court stated that summary
judgment was granted in favor of defendants because plaintiff had not
produced an expert witness to testify about an essential element of a
medical malpractice claim. 149 Furthermore, the court found that expert
testimony was not required in cases where a medical condition is
obvious, because the injury or illness creates a probability so strong
1401d. at 81-82.
141/d. at *82.
14 21d.
143Id. at *83.
'44Id. at *84.
145Sherman, 79 Conn. App. at *85.
14'Id. at *86.
147Id. at *87-88.
14'Id. at *88.
149Id.
[Vol. 7.1:141
CASE BRIEFS
that a lay jury can form a reasonable belief without the explanation of
expert testimony.' 50 However, the court found that morphine's
depressive effect on plaintiffs cardiac system did not constitute gross
medical negligence, and would not be obvious to the jury.' 51 The court
explained that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden preventing
summary judgment by showing the existence of material fact together
with evidence supporting that fact. 152 Furthermore, the court found
plaintiffs submissions inadequate to establish causation since the
defendants' experts had not testified that the defendants' negligence
caused plaintiffs injuries.' 53  Sherman v. Bristol Hospital, Inc., 79
Conn. App. 78 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
GOOD SAMARITAN
No Official Immunity For Ambulance Drivers But Good
Samaritan Law Applies
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld Good Samaritan immunity
after the plaintiff suffered probable cardiac arrest while on his way to a
North Dakota hospital. 154 The court also held official immunity did not
apply to acts involving medical discretion by the ambulance
attendants. 55 The immunity issues were affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded.15
6
The patient underwent a heart transplant shortly after his birth in
1995.17 In 1997, the patient's mother brought him to the emergency
room when he became ill.' 58 The physician concluded that the patient
was suffering from probable congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and
other potential problems. 59 The physician directed the staff to arrange
an ambulance to transfer him to another hospital in Fargo, North
Dakota. 160 The ambulance transported the patient along with another
15 0 d.
151!d. at *89-90.
52/d. at *90.
153Sherman, 79 Conn. App. at *90.154 Stodgell v. City of Warroad, No. CO-03-258, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1141, at *13
(Minn. App. Sept. 16, 2003).
15'Id. at *19.
1"Id. at *2.
'"Id. at *2.
'Id. at *2.
1'59Stodgell, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1141 at *2.
1601d.
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patient on a non-emergency basis.' 61 The ambulance first delivered the
other patient to Grand Forks Hospital, and then delivered the patient to
the Fargo hospital. 162 However, after leaving Grand Forks, and on the
way to Fargo, the patient suffered a probable cardiac arrest in the
ambulance, requiring emergency treatment. 63 The patient arrived at
Fargo hospital and suffered a cardiac arrest. 164 He was pronounced
dead, having suffered severe acute heart rejection.' 65
The court addressed two issues of immunity: (1) whether the city
is entitled to immunity under the Good Samaritan law; and (2) whether
official immunity is a question of law.
The court reversed the district court's ruling that Good Samaritan
immunity did not apply because the ambulance drivers were in transit
and had not provided emergency care for an emergency.166 Looking to
the Good Samaritan law, the court found that immunity applies
specifically when volunteer ambulance attendants encounter an
emergency situation. 167  Thus, events occurring while in transit
immunized the volunteer ambulance attendants, since the ambulance
had become "the scene of the emergency."'
168
For official immunity the court held the ambulance attendants had
exercised their medical discretion, which was not subject to official
immunity despite their municipal employment. 169 The court remanded
the case to determine the city's liability, if any, for its ambulance
attendants' actions, affirmed in part the Good Samaritan law; and
reversed in part official immunity. 70 Stodgell v. City of Warroad, No.
CO-03-258, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1141, (Minn. App. Sept. 16, 2003).
INFORMED CONSENT
Proof of Damages Limited for "Ghost Surgery" Plaintiffs
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied plaintiffs' motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of
1 6 1
id
161d. at *3.
163Stodgell, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1141 at *3.
,4 Id.1651d
1661d. at *12.167Stodgell, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1141 at *15.
616d.
169M. at *19.
170Id.
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complications following "ghost surgery."'17 1  The denial limited
recoverable damages plaintiffs could receive for their child's post-
surgery complications
Plaintiffs' daughter underwent surgery to remove a brain tumor. 172
She suffered known but rare complications after surgery.1 73 Plaintiffs
acknowledged the surgery was not improperly performed. 174 However,
plaintiffs alleged they permitted physician defendant to perform the
surgery, and defendant surgeon performed the surgery instead.1 75 Two
of plaintiffs' claims were considered by the Southern District.' 76 First,
plaintiffs alleged the defendants committed battery for performing
surgery without patient consent. 177  Second, plaintiffs alleged
defendants committed malpractice by misleading plaintiffs as to who
would be performing the surgery.
178
Previously, the court held that nominal damages are recoverable
for battery as are damages from discovery that a different doctor
performed a procedure. 79 Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to present
evidence of the surgery's complications regardless of whether the
surgical performance caused the injury.18 0 Defendants responded that
plaintiffs should not be allowed to present evidence of complications
since the complications were rare, but nonetheless foreseeable.' 8'
Plaintiffs must prove the elements of a tort case to recover
damages. 8 2  Plaintiffs must prove that "but for" a defendant's
action(s), plaintiffs would not have been injured and defendant's
action(s) proximately caused plaintiffs' injury.' 83  "Ghost surgery"
occurs when a plaintiff consents to the performance of a surgery and
for a certain surgeon to perform it, but it is actually performed by a
different surgeon. 184 Damages are recoverable only if plaintiffs can
show a reasonably prudent patient would not have consented to surgery
if he or she had been fully informed that someone else would perform
171Meyers v. Epstein, No. 01 Civ. 1754 (GWG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16114, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. September 16, 2003).172Id at *1.
17'ld at *2.
174
id.
175Meyers, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16114, *2.
17 61d.
177M at *2.
178Id.
179Id at *3.
I "Meyers, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16114 at *4.181id.
182/d at *5.
1832dL
'"Meyers, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16114 at * 12.
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it. The court found that plaintiffs could not show that the complications
resulted "but for" the unconsented substitution of surgeons, or that
plaintiffs would have refused consent for the surgery if they were
informed a different surgeon was to perform it.' 85 Thus, the court
denied the motion to permit evidence of complications and only
awarded nominal damages and damages for the "mental anguish"
suffered bY learning that a different surgeon performed the
procedure. Meyers v. Epstein, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16114 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 17, 2003).
MANDATORY REPORTING
Actions Outside Reporting Suspected Child Abuse Not Immune
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division reversed
the Circuit Court of Cook County order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss. 187  The court found defendant's actions amounted to an
investigation, not mere reporting, and therefore not entitled to a
presumption of good faith in reporting suspected abuse in accordance
with the state reporting act188 Furthermore, the court held that even if
defendant merely reported, material questions of fact existed as to
whether the good faith presumption was rebuttable.' 89
Plaintiff brought her daughter to defendant's Chicago Heights
campus for treatment of a fever. 190 After a urinalysis indicated trace
amounts of spermatozoa, defendant notified the Chicago Heights police
and Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) of
suspected child abuse, as required.191 On plaintiffs request, defendant
repeated tests and found no spermatozoa.'92 Defendant apologized for
misidentifying the lab results, and plaintiffs daughter was transferred
to defendant's Olympia Fields campus for treatment of her fever. 93
Although plaintiff advised defendant of the misidentified lab results,
defendant's agents began questioning plaintiff and her daughter about
child abuse, and insisted on performing multiple vaginal
185Id.
18 6Id at *17.187Lipscomb v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., No. 1-02-1495, 2003 Ill. App.
LEXIS 1135, at *29 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 15, 2003).188Id.
189Id.
'
901d. at *2-3.
'
911d. at *3.
192Lipscomb, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 1135, at *3-4.
t
9 3
1d.
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examinations.1 94 Possible child abuse was reported to DCFS a second
time. 195 Defendant prevented plaintiff's daughter from leaving until
DCFS consented to the release. 96 On the third day, DCFS "cleared
and released" plaintiff's daughter.' 97 Plaintiff filed a complaint and the
circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that
defendant was immune from liability in reporting cases of suspected
child abuse pursuant to the state reporting act.
198
The court first addressed whether defendant's actions amounted to
"reporting" under the reporting act.' 99  The reporting act grants
immunity only to those that report suspected abuse as required by the
reporting act; the court found questions of fact as to whether
defendant's conduct exceeded reporting to become an investigation
unprotected from immunity by the act.200  Furthermore, because
defendant had clear evidence of no sexual abuse resulting from testing
at Chicago Heights, the court inferred that defendant's initiation of new
questioning and examinations at Olympia Fields had no good faith
basis. 20  Therefore, there existed questions of fact whether defendant
had reasonable belief that plaintiffs daughter had been abused that
would justify an investigation under the reporting act.202
Second, the court questioned whether defendant's actions were
considered reporting, which would make defendant's good faith
participation in the investigation of the report immune from liability
under the reporting act.20 3 The court reasoned that an individual does
not act with good faith when (1) they report abuse without a reasonable
basis and (2) evidence suggests that the report was made for malicious
purposes. 20 4 Here, the court found plaintiff's complaint suggested there
was no reasonable basis for the report and investigation, and taken as
pled, suggest that the report was made for a malicious purpose
sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith.20 5 Lipscomb v. Sisters
94 d. at *4-5.
195Lipscomb, 2003 111. App. LEXIS 1135, at *4-5.
'
96
Id. at *4-5.
'
97Id. at *5.
198Id. at *5-6.
'
99Lipscomb, 2003 111. App. LEXIS 1135, at *10.2
°°Id. at * 16.
20 Id. at *16-17.
2°2Id. at * 17.
213/d. at *11.
2
°4Lipscomb, 2003 Il1. App. LEXIS 1135, at *24 (citing Doe v. Winny, 746 N.E.2d 143,
261 (2002).2 5/d. at *25.
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of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., No. 1-02-1495, 2003 Ill. App.
LEXIS 1135 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 15, 2003).
MEDICAID
Personal Injury Settlement Automatically Assignable as Condition
of Medicaid Eligibility
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
granted defendant Department of Human Services ("Department")
motion for summary judgment and held that settlement proceeds were
assigned to Department in their entirety and not limited to recovery for
past medical expenses.20
6
Plaintiff Medicaid recipient was awarded a substantial settlement
after suffering severe and permanent disabling injuries in a car
accident.207 The settlement award was based on permanent injury; past
and future medical expenses; loss of past and future earnings, but was
not allocated to these factors by percentage of the settlement or dollar
amount. 208 The plaintiff was granted Medicaid benefits in order to pay
for medical treatment required after the accident. 20 9 Defendant claimed
that it was entitled to the full settlement awarded to plaintiff as it was
assigned to it.210 Plaintiff argued defendant was entitled to a portion of
the settlement that could fairly be allocated to the benefits received by
Medicaid, specifically, past medical expenses.21'
The federal Medicaid program demands participating states to
include as a requirement to continued eligibility that Medicaid
recipients assign their interest to receive such settlement from liable
third parties. 22This requirement complied with the legislative intent
that Medicaid be the "payor of last resort." 2 13  Under the specific
Department plan, application for Medicaid benefits constituted
automatic assignment.
The court held the Department's statutory assignment provision
was consistent with legislative intent and federal law, and accordingly
206Ahlbom v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, No. 4:02-CV-00607, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15883, *1 (E.D. Ark. August 22, 2003).
1071d. at *2.
208ld.209 d. at *3.
2 'Id. at *5.
2 11Ahlborn, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15883 at *4.2121d. at *7.
213Id. at *5.
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granted summary judgment for defendant Department.214 Ahlborn v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15883 (E.D. Ark., August 22, 2003).
Patients Must Spend Down All Other Available Assets Before
Medicaid Covers Expenses
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court finding that the Illinois Department of
Human Services (IDHS) properly denied plaintiffs Medicaid
application.215 Since the plaintiffs trust retains the ability to pay for
certain custodial care expenses, the court upheld federal law mandating
that assets in the trust be depleted prior to plaintiffs eligibility for
Medicaid funds.
216
In 1993, plaintiff put her assets, which were worth a value of
$129,700, into an irrevocable trust. 2 1 Under the prudence of a trustee,
plaintiff was to be given a distribution of income for a period of time;
later, payments for custodial care would be provided to or for plaintiff
within specific guidelines.
218
Plaintiff applied for Medicaid with the Illinois Department of
Public Aid (IDPA) in 1999 when she entered a nursing home. 219 When
the IDHS determined the value of the trust, it concluded that the patient
must "spend down" her assets before Medicaid would pay for her
custodial care.220 Despite plaintiffs position that the trust was intended
to provide for that which Medicaid did not pay, an IDHS hearing
determined the principal of the trust was an available asset.221 Plaintiff
sought action to reverse the IDHS's conclusion; however, the trial court
affirmed its decision, while allowing a special representative to
substitute himself following plaintiffs 
death.22 2
The court considered two issues on appeal: first, whether the
trial court's order should be vacated and the appeal dismissed; and
223
second, the administrative agency's decision. 22 The court first held
214Id. at *21.
215Gayan v. Ill. Dep't of Human Services, No. 3-02-0545, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 1102,
at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 29, 2003)216Id. at *11.
21 Id. at *3.218Id. at *2.
2'91d. at *3.220Gayan, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 1102 at *3.
2211d. at *4-5.
22'ld. at *5-6.
223Id. at *7-8.
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that although the administrative agency shall be made a defendant in a
review a final decision of an administrative agency, when that issue is
not raised at the trial level it is deemed waived on appeal.224 The court
held federal law applied where "available assets" outweighed the
trustee's intent or discretion, and agreed with congressional intent to
limit Medicaid to those "truly needy.,
225
In making its decision the court looked to a congressionally
enacted statute which established stricter criteria on Medicaid Qualified
Trusts and allowed the entire corpus of an irrevocable trust as
countable, available assets.226 Reasoning that plaintiffs irrevocable
trust permitted specific guidelines allowing payment for custodial care,
the court concluded that all trust assets should be counted as available
assets.227
By upholding federal law which requires patients utilize their
assets in trust before they are eligible to receive Medicaid assistance;
the court affirmed the trial court's decision that IDHS properly denied
plaintiffs Medicaid application. 22 8  Gayan v. Ill. Dep't of Human
Services, No. 3-02-0545, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 1102 (Ill. App. Aug. 29,
2003).
MENTAL HEALTH
Rehearing and Review Proceeding May Not Change Initial
Determination of Mental Health Status
The Supreme Court of New York for the Appellate Division, Second
Department, affirmed part of the prior court's judgment holding the
decision to allow a New York insanity defense statute to govern as
proper.229 The court emphasized, however, that while a rehearing and
review proceeding may not alter an insanity acquittee's status
determined by the initial commitment order, it was proper to evaluate
and monitor findings on dangerousness.230
224 Id. at *7.
225 Gayan, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 1102, at *9.
226 Id. at "10-11.
22VId. at * 11.
228Id at *11-12.
229Matter of Norman D. (Anonymous), No. 2002-03184, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS
9270 at *2-3 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 8, 2003).
23°Id. at * 16.
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In 1997, the appellant became angry, assaulted his wife and
jeopardized the safety of his family by setting his couch afire.231 When
charged with arson, he pled guilty by reason of mental illness. 232 In
accordance with a New York insanity defense statute, he was confined
to a secure facility for six months and diagnosed as suffering from a
"dangerous mental disorder."233 After treatment, appellant was found
to no longer be dangerous and was transferred to a non-secure
2323
facility. 23 Appellant thereafter sought a reheaing and review of the
original commitment order. 
235
The court first considered the issue of whether the Supreme Court
improperly limited the scope of the rehearing and review proceeding.
236
The second issue it considered was whether an acquittee's track status,
established at the initial commitment hearing, may be changed for all
future proceedings if he is found to be mentally ill, but not
dangerous.2 37  The court affirmed the Supreme Court's decision to
allow the New York insanity defense statute to govern appellant's
status and any improvement or changes to his treatment.
238
The court decided that the trial court improperly considered the
mental condition of the appellant at that time of the initial
proceeding.239 It "might well be constitutionally infirm" to limit the
scope of such proceeding to an examination of the acquittee's mental
condition at the time of the initial commitment order.24 °
As to the second issue, the court concluded that the review
proceeding could not be used to modify the initial determination of
241track status. It reasoned that the review proceeding was not designed
as a substitute for an appellate review of the initial commitment
order.242 An acquittee suffering from a dangerous mental disorder at
the time of the initial proceeding requires continued oversight and
could be transferred, but the rehearing proceeding's purpose was not
appellate modification of track status.243 Therefore, the court affirmed
2311d. at *3.2321d.
23 31d. at *4.234Matter of Norman D. (Anonymous), 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9270 at *5.2351d. at *4.2361d. at * 12.23 7Id. at *13-14.
2381d. at *7, *16.239Matter of Norman D. (Anonymous), 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9270 at *12.24
°Id. at * 13.
14'Id. at *3.
242Id. at *15-16.243Id. at *3, *14.
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the decision that appellant remain under the New York statute
provisions.2 44 In the Matter of Norman D. (Anonymous), No. 2002-
03184, 2003 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9270 (N. Y Sept. 8, 2003).
PATIENT DUMPING
EMTALA Creates No Duty for Hospital to "Observe" Patients for
Up to Forty-Eight Hours After Stabilization
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held co-
defendants Hospital Dr. Susoni (HSD) and St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co. complied with the requirements imposed by the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and
therefore granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and
245dismissed plaintiff's claim with prejudice.
Mr. Milete Medero, a sixty-seven year-old male, was taken to the
HDS Emergency Room after complaining of chest and back pain on
September 14, 1997.246 While there, Medero underwent a physical
examination, vitals were taken, and several laboratory tests were done:
CPK, CPK-MB, blood analysis and urine analysis, X-rays, and two
electrocardiograms; also a cardiac monitor and foley catheter were
installed.247  Medero remained in the hospital for two days during
which the above tests were completed, a specialist on internal medicine
was consulted, and Medero was kept under observation until he was
discharged with oral antibiotics and instructions to return to the
emergency room if his condition deteriorated.248
Three days after being discharged, Medero went to Hospital
Cayetano Colly Toste's (HCCT) Emergency Department where once
again no evidence of myocardial infarction or changes existed,
however, the next day Medero died while in HCCT's care.249
Congress passed EMTALA in 1986 as part of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act to do away with the "dumping" of
indigent and uninsured patients from private hospitals to public
hospitals.250 EMTALA imposes a duty on "participating hospitals" to
244Matter of Norman D. (Anonymous), 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9270 at * 16.245Heirs of Juan Milete Medero v. Hospital Dr. Susoni, No. 99-2022(SEC), 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16226 at * 1-2 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Puerto Rico Sep. 8, 2003).246Id. at *2.
2 4 7
1d.
2481d. at *3.
249M. at *4.
250 Madero, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16226 at *4.
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conduct appropriate medical screening to determine a patient's medical
condition. In order to establish an EMTALA violation, a plaintiff.
must show the hospital is a participating hospital that operates an
emergency room, the patient arrived at the facility seeking treatment,
and the hospital either did not perform an appropriate screening or
turned a patient away without first stabilizing his or her condition.252
The court found no allegations in the complaint as to any disparate
treatment received by Medero, nor was this an issue in Medero's expert
report.253 The court also found it was undisputed that a screening
procedure was performed similar to the screening that any patient with
similar symptoms would have received. 4
The court concluded that Medero's claim that under EMTALA he
should have been left "in observation" for up to forty-eight hours was
incorrect and held that HSD complied with EMTALA requirements. 255
The court therefore granted HSD's motion for summary judgments and
dismissed Medero's claim with prejudice. 256 Medero v. Hospital Dr.
Susoni, No. 99-2022(SEC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16226 (U.S. Dist. Ct.
Puerto Rico Sep. 8, 2003).
PRIVACY
There is no Privacy Interest in a Patient's X-Ray as it Contains No
Intimate or Personal Information
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held the
District Court was correct in finding plaintiff had no constitutionally-
protected privacy interest in her X-rays. 257 Therefore, judgment of the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado in favor of
defendant was affirmed.258
AnnaMarie Ortlieb, a medical technologist for defendant Grand
River Hospital District, suffered a severely broken leg while on an
outing with other hospital employees in May of 1999.259 According to
Ortlieb, everyone came to the hospital with her to assist in her initial
251/d. at *8-9.
252Id. at *11.253/d. at * 17.254Id. at * 18.
255 Medero, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16226 at *19-20.256/d. at *21.
257Anna Marie Ortlieb v. Pat Howery, No. 02-1362, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17958 at
* 11 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2003).
2 58Id. at *11.
2 59Id. at *4.
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treatment. 26  Later, Ortlieb informed defendant Ron Smith, her
immediate supervisor at the hospital, of her injuries and need for
medical leave.26' Ortlieb subsequently requested an indefinite
extension of medical leave based on the severity of her injuries, for
which she attached her surgeon's Statement of Disability.
262
In making his decision of whether to recommend Ortlieb's request
for an extension, Smith retrieved her leg x-rays from the x-ray
department without Ortlieb's permission.263 After viewing the X-rays,
Smith was of the opinion that Ortlieb would never be "100 percent able
to do her previous job., 2 64 Grand River denied Ortlieb's request for an
indefinite extension of medical benefits and she was terminated in
November of 1999.265 Ortlieb sued Smith for invasion of her right to
privacy by obtaining and viewing her x-rays.
266
The District Court concluded that Ortlieb's right to privacy in her
X-rays was outweighed by Smith's substantial interest of determining
the nature and extent of her injuries in light of the demands of her job
and her leave status, however, it granted Smith qualified immunity and
concluded no constitutional violation had occurred because Ortlieb
failed to sufficiently allege Smith's conduct violated her right to
privacy.267 The Court of Appeals found there was nothing confidential
about the fact that Ortlieb had broken her leg because almost the entire
hospital staff came to her aid when she arrived for treatment and the X-
ray contained no facts or information of an intimate or personal
nature.
268
Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision that Ortlieb had no constitutionally-protected privacy right in
her x-rays and found that Smith was properly entitled to qualified
immunity.269 Ortlieb v. Howery, No. 02-1362, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
17958 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2003).
260Id.
261/d. at *5.
262 Ortlieb, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17958 at *5.
261Id. at *5.
26Id. at *5-6.265Id. at *6.266id"
267 Ortlieb, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17958 at *9-10.26Sld. at **10-1 1.269 d. at * 11.
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The Quality of Patient Care, Including Patient Privacy, is a Matter
of Public Concern Under the First Amendment
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the
plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of a First Amendment retaliation
claim to withstand summary judgment.270  Therefore, the Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the
case.
2 71
Plaintiff was employed by the Pauline Warfield Lewis Center
("Lewis Center"), an Ohio state mental hospital, as the Director of
Quality Management. 272 Her responsibilities included preparing the
Center for surveys by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH).273 On January of 1999, defendant CEO revoked
plaintiffs appointment; attaching a memo to inform plaintiff her
position would be revoked because of incidents in which plaintiff
complained of patients' privacy being compromised.274 Plaintiff had
sent a memo to the defendant addressing the allocation of space in the
Lewis Center's psychiatric units as it related to an upcoming JCAH,275
survey, and a recent move of the psychiatrists' offices. Plaintiff filed
a complaint with the District Court, alleging wrongful termination
based on "reverse" racial discrimination and for exercising her First
Amendment right to free speech.276
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment against both of
plaintiffs claims, at which time plaintiff withdrew her "reverse" racial
discrimination claim, but opposed summary judgment on her First
Amendment claim. 77 The District Court granted defendant's motion,
reasoning that plaintiffs memo to the defendant did not touch upon a
matter of public concern to sustain plaintiffs First Amendment
claim.278
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the purpose of
plaintiff's memo to call the defendant's attention to a possible disregard
of patient privacy at the Lewis Center, not to complain about
270Rodgers v. Banks, No. 01-4034, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19201*2 (6th Cir. September
17, 2003).271Id. at *2.
2 7 2
Id.
2 7 3
1d.
274Id. at *3.
275Rodgers, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19201 at *3.
276Id. at *5.2771d. at *7.
2781d.
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279
management or other internal disputes. Moreover, the court said the
quality of patient care such as patient privacy was an issue of public
concern under the First Amendment, and that plaintiff's memo did not
appear to be inflammatory on its face. 280 The court also found that
plaintiff met her burden of showing that her First Amendment protected
activity was a motivating factor in her termination.
28 1
Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's order
granting defendant summary judgment and remanded the case to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.282
Rodgers v. Banks, No. 01-4034, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19201 (6th Cir.
September 17, 2003).
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
State Department of Health Prohibited From Disclosing
Allegations of Professional Misconduct by Physicians Cleared of
Wrongdoing
The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, First Department
reversed the lower court decision which denied a physician's
application to annul findings in a disciplinary proceeding by the State
Board for Professional Conduct.283
The Department of 'Health charged the petitioner physician with
performing a serious form of medical misconduct, which included but
was not limited to failure to maintain a good medical record and
practicing medicine beyond authorization.284 An Administrative Law
Judge and State Board committee found the Department of Health's
evidence insufficient to prove that the physician had practiced beyond
authorization, or committed any serious forms of misconduct.285
However, the committee did sustain the charge of failing to maintain a
proper medical record.286 Although the committee stated that an
administrative warning would be a sufficient penalty, statutory
authority required a reprimand.287
"Id. at *29.
28Rodgers, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19201 at *30-31.
281Id. at *38.2821d. at *39.
283Anonymous v. 903 Bureau, No. 903, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9343, *19 (NY
App. Sept. 11, 2003).284Idat *2-3.
2851d at *3.2861d at *4.
287Anonymous, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9343 at *5.
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Following these proceedings, the Department of Health posted all
allegations on its website, including the facts and specifications of the
charges brought against the physician.288  The physician asked the
Department to remove all charges because the posting of the unproven
allegations caused damage to his personal and professional
reputation. The physician subsequently filed a petition to have the
Department remove the allegations. The Supreme Court denied the
motion, and stated that the public had a right to be informed of that
information until a determination was reached.29'
On appeal, the Court found no legitimate state interest in posting
charges against the physician after they had been disseminated.292 In
support of its decision, the Court looked to the statutory prohibitions
precluding the Department from publishing not guilty verdicts from
criminal proceedings, pending malpractice actions, and dismissed
malpractice actions. 9 The Court reversed the lower court, and found
its decision "arbitrary, capricious and a total abuse of discretion.
'
"
294
Anonymous v. 903 Bureau, No. 903, 2003 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9343,
*19 (NYApp. Sept. 11, 2003).
Basic Knowledge of Injury and Cause Tolls Statute of Limitations;
Complete Knowledge Not Necessary
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina entered a verdict for the United States in an action against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).295 Pregnant
plaintiff received medical care as a dependent of her Marine husband at
a Navy Regional Medical Care Center.296 She brought a claim against
members and civilian personnel of the United States Navy because she
received a blood transfusion in 1983, negligently and without her
informed consent.
297
After plaintiffs family physician recognized problems with her
labor, he consulted an obstetrician, who concurred with the course of
2881d.
2891d at *6.
290id.291 d at*8.
292Anonymous, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9343 at *10.293Id at *19.2
'
4Id at * 12.295Doe, et al., v. U.S of America, No. 1:01CV00646, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15250, at
*1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2003).
2961d. at *2.
297Id. at * 1.
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298treatment to perform an emergency Caesarean section. Although
plaintiff signed a consent form, and both physicians alleged that they
told her that excessive bleeding could require a blood transfusion, she
had no recollection of any consultation.299
Plaintiff experienced significant blood loss from her Caesarean
section. 300 Based on the medical information, but without going to her
for clinical evaluation or additional consent, the physician performing
the procedure ordered a blood transfusion. 30 1 The blood came from a
blood bank operated by the Navy.30 2 Three years later the plaintiff
gave birth to her second child and received another transfusion.30 3
Nine years later, on July 31, 1995, she tested positive for AIDS, and
learned she had full-blown AIDS.30 4
The court discussed three issues: (1) lack of consent; (2) medical
malpractice; and (3) statute of limitations.30 5  The government
contended that the FTCA's two year statute of limitations barred her
claims, since the claims accrued upon discovery of her infection on
July 31, 1995, and she had not filed the claim until September 1998."'
The court held that plaintiffs claims accrued on July 31, 1995, since
she knew her only risk factors were sex with a male and blood
transfusion; and her husband tested negative twice for HIV. 30 7
Accordingly, the court stated that lingering uncertainty would not
prevent claim accrual. 30 8 Furthermore, the claims were also barred by
the statute of limitations, since she had not established any misleading
conduct by the Navy to justify tolling of the statute of limitations.30 9
Even if plaintiffs claims had not been barred by the statute of
limitations, the court found that she had failed to prove both that the
defendant violated the applicable standard of care by ordering the
transfustion, and that she had not given her informed consent for the
initial transfusion.310 The decision of the circuit court was affirmed in
favor of the United States.311 Doe, et al., v. U.S. of America, No.
298Id. at *2-3.299Id. at *34.30Old.
3 1Doe, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152504 at *6.302id.
3031d. at *6.3041d. at *7.
3 5Id. at *12, 24, 30.306Doe, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152504 at *12, 14.3071d. at *15.3
°
8Id. at *18-19.3 9Id. at *36.31Old
31
'Doe, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152504 at *36.
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1:01CV00646, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15250, (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27,
2003).
TAXATION
Indiana Tax Providing Emergency Medical Care for Indigent
Patients Found Constitutional in Determining Tax Rate Scheme
The Indiana Tax Court affirmed its prior judgment that Indiana's
Hospital Care for Indigent Tax (HCI tax) did not violate the state
constitution, and further did not violate the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
312Constitution.
The purpose of the HCI tax was to provide free emergency
medical care for indigent patients not covered by Medicaid. 313 An HCI
fund was established for each Indiana county, whereby counties with
more indigent people seeking emergency medical care were taxed at a
proportionately higher rate.314 Taxpayer further argued this was
unconstitutional to tax him more than other state residents for living in
a county with more indigents because it arbitrarily "establishes a class
of taxpayers... and provides them with a privilege not equally shared by
members of the same class."31
5
The state argued that the HCI tax was constitutional and the Equal
Protection Clause did not apply because it did not create classes of
taxpayers within the county.316 The state argued that there was no
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because procedurally taxpayers were given both notice and meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Further, the state argued that the HCI tax
did not violate substantive due process because it was not arbitrary,
oppressive, or unjust.318
The court rejected taxpayer's claim because the distinction
between counties was not arbitrary; but was in fact reasonable, because
it matched the burden of each county with the benefit each received.319
The court expounded on this by noting that the particular taxpayer was
312Griffin v. Department of Local Government Finance, No. 49T10-0009-TA-98, 2003
Ind. Tax LEXIS 83 at *1-2 (September 9, 2003).313Id. at *3.
3 14Id. at *4.
315Id. at *7.316Griffin, 2003 Ind. Tax LEXIS at *11.
317Id. at 12.3181d.
319Id. at *8.
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paying the same tax rate as other taxpayers within his county.320 The
court further held that the HCI tax was within the legitimate interest of
the state and therefore valid.32 1 For all these reasons, the Court affirmed
that the HCI tax did not violate the Indiana or United States
constitution. 322  Michael Griffin and Lake County v. Department of
Local Government Finance, No. 49T10-0009-TA-98, 2003 Ind. Tax
LEXIS 83 (September 9, 2003).
TORTS
Plaintiffs Allowed Personal Injury Claim Against Landlord For
Unsafe Drinking Water
The Court of Appeals of Washington reversed the judgment of the
Superior Court that granted defendants summary judgment on a
personal injury claim brought by their tenants for contaminated
drinking water.323 The Court held that a tenant could file a claim for
personal injury based on contract law, common law, and the
Washington Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973.324
Plaintiffs, a family with four children, were tenants in a mobile
home where a ground well supplied water.325  Prior to the tenants
moving in, the landlords who purchased the property had an inspection
done on the well.326 The inspection revealed that the well contained
high nitrate levels and that the well should be tested once a year.327
The landlords stated they "thumbed through" the report but relied on a
real estate agent to give notice of any problems, which the agent had
not.
32 8
Parents and children became ill and suffered from diarrhea and
vomiting.3 29 A pediatric nurse who administered care suggested thatthe well water be tested, and later testified that the illnesses were due to
32
°Griffin, 2003 Ind. Tax LEXIS at *8.321Id. at *11.322Id. at *16.323id.
324Don Tucker, et al. v. Robert Hayford, et al., No. 21544-0-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS
1912 at* 1-2 (September 4, 2003).
325Id. at *2,4.326,d.
327Id. at *2-3.328Tucker, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS at *4.3291d.
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contaminated water from the well. 330 Tenants informed landlord of the
results of the test, and they had the well fixed.3 31
The court first addressed whether remedies were limited only by
the Washington Landlord-Tenant Act.332  The court held the prior
decisions that remedies were limited by this act were incorrect and that
plaintiffs were entitled to file suit not only under this act, but also under
contractual and common law obligations. 333 Tenants were entitled to
file a claim based on the landlords' contractual duty to perform major
maintenance and repair, and based on the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
which covered maintenance of the well.334 The court stated that under
common law, the tenants were entitled to an implied warranty of
habitability which covered a safe supply of drinking water.335
Therefore, the court held that tenants were entitled to seek relief from
the Washington Landlord-Tenant Act which required the landlords to
"keep the premises fit for habitation. 336
The court reasoned that under all three legal remedies, the tenants
were entitled to file a complaint for personal injuries because they were
entitled to a habitable residence in which the drinking water was
safe.337 Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
judgment that the tenants were not entitled to personal injury damages
based on the Washington Landlord-Tenant Act.338 Don Tucker and
Shalee Miller v. Robert Hayford and Dakota Hayford, No. 21544-0-111,
2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1912 (September 4, 2003).
Defendant's Criminal Responsibility not Relieved by Physician's
Negligence During the Care of a Gunshot Victim
The Court of Appeals of Iowa affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment to the State on the petitioner's claim that negligent medical
treatment provided to the petitioner's gunshot victim was the proximate
cause of the victim's death.33 9
330Id.3311d
332Tucker, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS at *1.
333Id.
3341d. at *5.3351d. at * 13.
336Id. at * 17.337Tucker, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS at *17.338Id. at *2.339Garcia v. Iowa, No. 3-440/02-1616, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 730 at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Aug. 27, 2003).
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Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it prohibited him
from presenting evidence that physician's actions were an intervening
event, which constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death.34
The appellant shot the victim four times, and was charged with first-
degree murder.341 Appellant and four others had been hired to punish
the victim for non-payment on a drug deal.342 While hospitalized, the
victim's tracheotomy tube, which was connected to the ventilator, was
nicked by an employee during a shaving procedure. 343  While the
attending physician was changing the tubes to provide the victim with
increased oxygen in his lungs, the victim's swollen neck caused the
airway to close. 344 The physician was unable to replace the tube, and
the victim asphyxiated.
The court first considered whether summary judgment was
proper. 346 Appellant claimed the trial and appellate courts erred by not
considering the employee's nicking the tracheotomy tube as the
proximate cause of the victim's death, instead of the negligence of the
physician in reinserting a new tube.347 The court held the victim's
death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a circumstance
generated by appellant's criminal actions.
348
In order for an intervening act to relieve a defendant of criminal
responsibility, the act must be the sole proximate cause of death.349
The court found no difference between the physician's and employee's
actions; the employee's action led to the physician's attempt to reinsert
the tube, so the employee's actions would not be considered different
than the physician 
350
The court agreed with the Supreme Court's holding that "no
reasonable fact finder could conclude the medical treatment was the
sole proximate cause of death., 351 The judgment in favor of the State
was affirmed.352 Garcia v. Iowa, No. 3-440/02-1616, 2003 Iowa App.
LEXIS 730 (Iowa Aug. 27, 2003).
34
°Id. at *2-3.341Id. at *2.
342/d.
3 4 3
1d.
344Garcia, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 730 at *2.345Id. at *2.
3461d. at *4.347Id. at *3.348Id. at *5.349Garcia, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 730 at *4.35
°Id. at *5.351Id. at *6.
35 2Garcia, 2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 730 at *1-2.
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UNFAIR COMPETITION
Plaintiff Entitled Equitable Relief Since Covenant Not to Compete
Found Enforceable
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed and remanded the
trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction to enforce a covenant not
to compete on charges of irreparable and immediate harm.
353
Plaintiff owned a dental practice started the defendant, plaintiffs
uncle, in 1967. 354 In 1984, defendant hired plaintiff and in 1990, sold
him a one-half interest in the practice for $250,000. 35 5 They worked
together as partners for five years, during which time co-defendant,
plaintiffs cousin and defendant's niece, was hired.356  In 1996
defendant sold plaintiff the remaining interest in the practice for
another $250,000, through a purchase agreement which included a
covenant not to compete, a provider agreement, and a provision that
defendant could be fired only with cause for five years and thereafter
with ninety days notice.357 The covenant not to compete prevented
defendant from practicing within fifteen miles from the time of the sale
of the practice until three years after defendant ceased employment
with the plaintiff.
358
The two parties dissociated in 1999 and, according to an affidavit
by the defendant, orally agreed that he could practice within fifteen
miles of the plaintiff.359 However, plaintiff claimed that defendant
actively solicited to hire his employees, including the co-defendant.36 °
Consequently, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of contract,
misappropriation of confidential information, and tortuous interference
with prospective advantage. 361 The defendants asserted counterclaims
for anticipatory repudiation of the purchase agreement, breach of that
agreement, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair practices.
362
353 Kennedy v. Kennedy, No. COA02-1 198, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1675 at *4 (N.C.
App. Aug. 19, 2003)3 541d. at * 1355id.
3561d. at *23571d.
3 8 Kennedy, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1675 at *4.3591d.
36
°Id. at *4.361Id.
3 6 2 1d.
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The issues before the court included: (1) whether plaintiff had
standing to enforce the terms of the purchase agreement; (2) whether
the covenant not to compete was enforceable; (3) whether there was a
novation of the purchase agreement; (4) whether plaintiff repudiated or
breached the purchase agreement; and (5) whether plaintiff was entitled
to equitable relief.363 The court held that the plaintiff had standing to
enforce the agreement on grounds that plaintiff had been assigned all
the rights and obligations under that purchase agreement, even though
no guaranty had been executed with that provision.364 The court noted
that plaintiff had already performed his obligations and assumed his
duties under the purchase agreement. 3
65
The court also found the restrictive covenant enforceable for two
reasons: (1) it restricted only a small geographic area, which balanced
off the three-year restriction; and (2) there was nothing within the
covenant that violated public policy, since it was intended to protect a
legitimate interest of the covenantee and was not oppressive to the
covenantor or public.366  The court further held that there was no
evidence of a novation of the purchase agreement, because both parties
did not have clear and definite interest to substitute a new agreement
for the existing agreement.. 367
The court also rejected the defendants' counterclaim that plaintiff
had breached the agreement, because the defendants failed to produce
evidence of plaintiffs failure to pay money owed under the purchase
agreement, and no additional letter of intent to terminate within ninety
days was needed in addition to the letter from plaintiff to the
defendant. 368  Since there was no evidence that plaintiff had acted
fraudulently or with unclean hands, the court reversed and remanded
the case for preliminary injunction. 369  Kennedy v. Kennedy, No.
COA02-1198, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1675 (NC. App. Aug. 19, 2003).
363Kennedy, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1675 at *4-5.
3
"Id. at *7.3651d.
366Kennedy, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1675 at *15-16.
3671d. at *20.
368Id. at *23-24.
369Kennedy, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1675 at *26-28.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
No Workers' Compensation For Mental Injury Based on Perceived
Exposure to HIV
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgment of a trial court
that had awarded workers' compensation benefits to an employee who
claimed a chronic mental disorder stemming from her perceived
exposure to HIV, after she came into contact with the blood of a co-
worker.
370
Plaintiff-appellee was working on an assembly line when her co-
worker lacerated his hand and got some of his blood on her hand,
which had open cuts. 371  Plaintiff believed the co-worker was HIV
positive because he appeared very frail, was frequently sick, was on a
mailing list of a gay rights organization and "looked and acted gay."
372
Her perception that she had been exposed to HIV caused her to become
hysterical, subject to panic attacks, and ultimately led to a diagnosis of
post-traumatic stress disorder.
373
Her treating psychiatrist testified that plaintiff was vocationally
disabled, because she could not engage in assembly line work where
blood could be shed, or in work requiring public contact or a great deal
of concentration. 374 Based on the foregoing the trial court awarded
plaintiff permanent partial disability of 38% for her mental faculties.375
When the defendant appealed, the Supreme Court was faced with
an issue of first impression: whether a mental injury stemming from
fear of HIV exposure is compensable in workers' compensation
claims.376 Although the case law recognized mental injuries caused by
an identifiable, work-related event as compensable, the court held that
plaintiff would have to prove her fear was based on actual exposure to
HIV, not perceived exposure. 377  The court explained that plaintiff
offered no proof her co-worker was HIV positive, and therefore found
37 0Guess v. Sharp Mfg. Co. of Am., No. W2002-00818-WC-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS
722 at * 1-2 (Tenn. Aug. 27, 2003).37 11d. at *3.
172M. at *3.
3731d. at *34.
3741d. at *5.
375 Guess, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 722 at *5-6.376 d. at *9, 12.
377Id. at *I11- 13.
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no connection between her injury and employment, particularly since
she tested negative five times for the virus.
378
The court reasoned that to accept plaintiff's subjective impressions
concerning her co-worker's sexual-orientation would be to promote
prejudices and stereotypes surrounding AIDS.3 79  Additionally, the
court held that to permit recovery under these facts would allow
recovery for anybody suffering from a mental injury stemming from
imagined exposure to harmful substances. 3 80 Believing this result to be
contrary to state law, the court reversed the decision of the trial court
and imposed appeal costs on plaintiff.381 Guess v. Sharp Mfg. Co. of
Am., No. W2002-00818-WC-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 722 (Tenn.
Aug. 27, 2003).
WRONGFUL BIRTH/WRONGFUL LIFE
No Legal Injury For Loss of Abortion Opportunity Resulting in
Genetically Or Congenitally Impaired Human Life
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in a discretionary review of two
separate cases, held that parents of a child born with incurable and
profound birth defects do not have a cause of action for negligence
against their physician for failure to diagnose, or inform them of, the
fetal medical condition in time for an abortion.382 The child was also
precluded from a cause of action for the same errors or omissions
because of the failure to prove any cognizable legal injury. 383 The
Supreme Court of Kentucky reinstated the final judgment of the Knox
Circuit Court, dismissing all claims against the plaintiff reinstating the
final judgment of the wrongful birth and wrongful life claims. 384 The
Supreme Court of Kentucky remanded claims for pain and suffering
and permanent scarring suffered by plaintiff Bogan resulting from
caesarean section delivery. 38
5
3 78Id. at *16.3 791d. at *15-16.380Guess, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 722 at * 17-18.
381Id. at *18-19.382Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C. AND Bogan v. Altman & McGuire,
Nos. 2001-SC-0563-DG, 2001-SC-0916-DG, 2001-SC-0571-DG, 2001-SC-0959-DG, 2003
Ky. Lexis 178 at *19 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2003) (Wintersheimer, J., concurring in part, Keller, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
383Id. at *20.
384Id. at *25.3851d.
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After 24 weeks of pregnancy, Plaintiff Grubbs sought prenatal
screening ultrasound from her physician, who informed her that the
results showed the pregnancy proceeding normally. 386  However, a
second ultrasound by the same physician revealed that the fetus might
have birth defects. 387 Baby Grubbs was born with spina bifida and
hydrocephalus, which caused her to be paralyzed from the waist down,
and to have poor vision and malformed kidneys. 388
Plaintiff Bogan, after discovering she was pregnant, also sought a
prenatal screening ultrasound.389 The ultrasound technician ruled out
obvious anomalies, and informed her that the pregnancy was
proceeding normally.390 However, Baby Bogan was born prematurely
and by caesarean section.391 A cyst, occupying most of his cranium,
had enlarged.392 As a result, he had no eyes, an underdeveloped brain
stem, but no brain, a cleft palate which inhibited speech, and he had no
bowel control. 39
3
Both plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that their caretakers failed
to inform them that the initial ultrasound revealed the presence of birth
defects, and had they known, they would have terminated their
pregnancies. 394  Therefore, plaintiffs' argued that the defendants'
failure to timely notify them, prevented them from making an informed
decision to continue or terminate the pregnancy. 395 In the Grubbs's
case, the trial court authorized the plaintiffs claim for the full amount
of damages, though it was eventually dismissed for statute of limitation
reasons. 3 96 In the Bogans' case, the trial court held they could not
recover on the wrongful birth or wrongful death claims, but allowed
damages for pain and suffering and permanent scarring resulting from
the caesarean deliver. 397 Both trial courts refused to recognize the
wrongful life claim.3  The Court of Appeals consolidated the two
cases to consider whether Kentucky law recognizes birth-related torts
386Id. at *4.
387Grubbs, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 178 at *4.388Id. at *4-*5.
389Id. at *6.
39
°Id. at *7.
3 9 1
Id"
392Grubbs, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 178 at *7.
3 9 3
1d.
394Id. at *5, *8.
3 9 5
Id. at *5, *7-*8.
396
Id. at *8.3 9 7
Id.
398Grubbs, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 178 at *8.
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and ultimately concluded that it was a matter within the exclusive
purview of the legislature. 3
99
The court had to decide whether the facts presented could be
decided on the traditional negligence principles, or whether deference
to legislative initiative would be more appropriate. 40 0 The court held
that the physician-patient relationship established a duty to inform the
patient of a diagnosis and the known risks or dangers of the diagnosis,
so that the patient could make an intelligent decision regarding the
course of treatment.4° 1 The court also found that a breach of that duty
would constitute negligence.40 2 The court added that pregnancy could
trigger the duty of full disclosure and misdiagnosis, and that
withholding of medical information regarding the pregnancy could be
considered a breach.40 3 However, only when a breach of the standard
of care proximately caused injury or death, would all the elements of
negligence been established, thus giving rise to the claim.40 4
The court reasoned that the negligent misdiagnosis alleged caused
plaintiffs' injury, and that plaintiffs would not have continued their
pregnancies if they had known of the birth defects.40 5 However, the
court held that it was unwilling to equate the loss of an abortion
opportunity resulting in a genetically or congenitally impaired human
life, with a cognizable legal injury. 40 Alternatively, the court held that
the physicians who contract and charge for these services could be
liable for any breach of contract if not performed correctly.40 7 The
concurring opinion stressed the policy reasons for precluding wrongful
birth and wrongful life claims, arguing that it was dangerous and
unethical to propose that life itself could constitute some kind of legal
injury, and a subjective determination about the disabilities of the
unborn.40 8 Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C. AND
Bogan v. Altman & McGuire, Nos. 2001-SC-0563-DG, 2001-SC-0916-
DG, 2001-SC-0571-DG, 2001-SC-0959-DG, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 178 (Ky.
Aug. 21, 2003).
399Id. at *8-*9.400 d. at * 11.401Id. at *13.4021d. at *13-*14.
4 03/d. at *14.4
°4Grubbs, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 178 at *15.4O5/d.
4
°6Id. at * 19.4071d. at *24.
40 8Grubbs, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 178 at *25 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring in part).
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WRONGFUL TERMINATION
Termination Allowed When No Supporting Public Policy Based on
State Law Presented
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
judgment of the District Court dismissing plaintiffs' claim for wrongful
termination, because plaintiffs failed to sufficiently articulate a public
policy which would prevent their termination.40 9
Plaintiffs were employed at-will at a residential care facility
operated by the defendant.410  They suspected a fellow employee of
stealing drugs from the facilities medication room.4 11 They reported
the incident to a medical consultant, rather than the administrator as the
employer's policy required, and were fired for failure to follow the
proper chain of command.412 Plaintiffs alleged that Oklahoma state law
prevented termination of an at-will employee for performance of an act
that public policy would encourage.413
The only issue before the court was whether plaintiffs had
established clear and compelling public policy that spoke against their
termination for such acts. 414 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to
articulate public policy in support of their claim. q 5
The court found that the plaintiffs could not rely on the Nursing
Home Care Act since the defendant's facility was not governed by this
act.. Further the court found that plaintiffs had waived their policy
argument based on the Residential Care Act by not presenting it in the
district court.4 17 Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to
show how the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act applied
to their circumstances, and because the section they cited was
repealed.. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the summary
judgment.419  Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., No. 02-5040,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18769 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2003).
409Wilbum v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., No. 02-5040, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18769
at *1 (10 h Cir. Sept. 10, 2003).4 10 d.
41 Id. at *2.
4121d"
413Wilburn, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18769 at *7.4141d. at *6.415Id. at *9-11.
4""Id. at *11.
41'71d. at *15.
411Wilburn, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18769 at *17.
4'91d. at *18.
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